What a Realistic Greenfield Car Wash Pro Forma Actually Looks Like in 2026
Year 1 through Year 5 numbers, realistic ramp curves, cost structure, and returns for express tunnel car wash development in 2026. Built from public operator disclosures, industry benchmarking, and our team's operating data across 60+ developed sites.

Most car wash pro formas I see are wrong by Year 2. Not because the math is bad, because the assumptions are. The same five numbers keep getting inflated: ramp speed, peak CPD, membership penetration, average ticket, and operating margin.
Here's what a realistic express tunnel pro forma actually looks like in 2026, built from public operator disclosures (Mister Car Wash, Driven Brands pre-divestiture), industry benchmarking reports (the ICA and Rinsed quarterly industry data), current Southeast construction cost benchmarks, and our team's operating data across 60+ developed sites.
The all-in basis you should expect
For an express exterior tunnel on owned real estate, Southeast US, 2026 pricing. Construction costs are up roughly 6% year-over-year per Gordian's Q1 2025 index, so 2026 sits meaningfully above the 2022 baseline most older pro formas used.
| Component | Range |
|---|---|
| Land (0.8 to 1.5 acres) | $900K – $2.5M |
| Site work + utilities | $650K – $1.1M |
| Building shell (PEMB or tilt-wall) | $700K – $1.1M |
| Tunnel equipment (PDQ, Belanger, MacNeil, or equivalent) | $650K – $950K |
| Pay stations + POS (ICS, DRB Patheon, Sonny's) | $200K – $350K |
| Chemistry system (Trident, NCS, or equivalent) | $70K – $110K |
| Vacuum equipment + canopies | $200K – $325K |
| Reclaim system | $130K – $200K |
| Soft costs (A&E, permits, branding, contingency) | $320K – $525K |
| Pre-opening + working capital | $180K – $300K |
| Total all-in | $4.0M – $7.5M |
Variance is mostly land cost plus site complexity. The equipment package itself is more consistent than people think. Premium West Coast comparables can run over $10M all-in, but those are outliers for Southeast underwriting.
Revenue ramp, what to actually model
Most pro formas I review assume a 24-month ramp to stabilization. Real data says it's closer to 30-42 months in most markets, and the curve isn't linear. Year 1 is mostly grand-opening promotional bleed; the membership flywheel kicks in during Year 2; stabilization lands in Year 3 to early Year 4 in a healthy market.
Year 1
- Cars per day: 180-230 average
- Membership penetration (members ÷ unique monthly customers): 4-7%
- Average ticket (blended): $11.50-$14.00
- Revenue: $750K-$1.1M
Year 1 is grand opening promo bleed and brand awareness. Don't model heroically.
Year 2
- Cars per day: 240-320 average
- Membership penetration: 8-12%
- Average ticket: $13.00-$15.50
- Revenue: $1.2M-$1.7M
Year 2 is where the membership flywheel starts. If membership growth stalls here, you have a marketing or product problem.
Year 3
- Cars per day: 280-380 average
- Membership penetration: 12-16%
- Average ticket: $14.50-$17.00
- Revenue: $1.5M-$2.1M
Year 4-5 (stabilized)
- Cars per day: 320-420 average
- Membership penetration: 14-18%
- Average ticket: $15.50-$18.50
- Revenue: $1.8M-$2.6M
Above $2.6M in stabilized revenue is best-in-class for the Southeast. Above $3.0M usually involves a uniquely strong site or a premium market. Mister Car Wash's full-year 2025 results (>$1.05B across roughly 500+ sites) imply average site revenue well below $2.6M, so anything above the high end deserves scrutiny on the underlying assumptions.
Cost structure, where the model breaks
Stabilized operating costs as a percent of revenue for a well-run express tunnel:
| Cost category | % of revenue |
|---|---|
| Labor | 15-22% |
| Chemistry | 5-7% |
| Utilities (water + power) | 6-9% |
| Repairs + maintenance | 5-8% |
| Marketing | 3-6% |
| Insurance | 2-3% |
| Property tax | 2-4% |
| Credit card fees | 2.5-3.5% |
| Other (supplies, software, etc.) | 3-5% |
| Total OpEx | 43-62% |
The biggest gap between strong and weak operators isn't revenue, it's labor and maintenance discipline.
Returns, what the deal actually pencils to
Stabilized financials on a $5.5M all-in basis with $2.0M stabilized revenue and 45% EBITDA margin:
- Stabilized EBITDA: $900K
- EBITDA exit multiple (Year 7), single-site OpCo+PropCo basis: 6.5-8.5x for a strong single site
- EBITDA exit multiple if rolled into a platform sale, OpCo basis: 9-11x with premium membership-anchored portfolios trading higher
- Stabilized cash-on-cash return: 12-17%
- Unlevered IRR (7-year hold): 13-18%
- Levered IRR (60-65% LTV, 7-year hold): 20-27%
The basis matters more than the headline multiple. OpCo-only deals (typical for platform sales where the underlying real estate has been sale-leasebacked) trade higher because EBITDA is measured after rent. OpCo+PropCo deals (typical for single-site fee-simple exits) trade lower because EBITDA is measured before rent and the buyer is paying for the land. Don't compare them directly without normalizing.
Reference transactions for the platform band: Whistle Express acquired Take 5 Car Wash from Driven Brands in April 2025 for $385M across 385 sites. That deal was largely OpCo-only — Take 5 had previously sale-leasebacked most of the underlying real estate — so the headline ~8x understates where comparable membership-anchored platforms with full corporate infrastructure would trade today (currently 9-11x OpCo, with premium portfolios going higher). Mister Car Wash announced its take-private to Leonard Green & Partners in February 2026 at $3.1B enterprise value, a NTM multiple of approximately 11.9x, confirming the upper end of the platform band.
Single-site stabilized assets in the public NNN real estate market are pricing around a 6.2-6.5% cap rate as of early 2026, which corresponds to roughly a 15-16x multiple on the rent line and a blended OpCo+PropCo exit multiple of approximately 6.5-8x at typical operating cost structure. Cap rates have been compressing through 2025.
Below the ranges above, the deal isn't competitive with comparable real estate plays. Above those numbers, double-check your assumptions. And before you commit to greenfield, run the buy-vs-build comparison: in markets where comparable stabilized sites are trading at or below your $4.0M-$7.5M replacement cost, acquisition is often the better risk-adjusted move than development.
The five assumptions that break models
- Ramp speed. People model 24-month stabilization. It's 30-42.
- Membership penetration. People model 20%. Rinsed's Q4 2025 industry benchmarks show top-quartile sites converting 15.6% of retail customers to members; the typical site converts 10% or less. Mister Car Wash's published 'capture rate north of 10%' at the pay station is best-in-class. Plan for 14-18% mature penetration in a strong site, not 20%+.
- Average ticket. People model $18 from Day 1. You get there in Year 4 if you're disciplined on pricing and tier mix.
- Labor cost. People model 14%. It's 16-22% in most Southeast markets in 2026.
- Maintenance capex. People model $0.03/car. Realistic recurring capex on a stabilized tunnel runs $0.08-$0.12/car; if equipment is aging it climbs to $0.25/car or higher.
Build your model with realistic assumptions and pressure-test by running it at -15% on revenue and +20% on opex. If it still pencils, you have a real deal. If it doesn't, you're hoping for upside that the operating data says you probably won't get.
The 2026 reality check
Two market signals every developer should be reading:
- ZIPS Car Wash filed Chapter 11 in February 2025 with $654M of debt across 260 locations. The CEO publicly cited oversaturation from "900 new car washes annually." Multiple markets are now over-built.
- Driven Brands sold its entire US car wash business (Take 5 Car Wash, 385 sites) to Whistle Express in April 2025 for $385M, exiting the sector. That's a sophisticated operator concluding the risk-adjusted returns no longer fit their portfolio strategy.
The implication for greenfield underwriting: site selection matters more than it did in 2021-22. The capital cycle peak is over. Sites that would have penciled in 2022 because the rising tide lifted everything may not pencil in 2026.
How we model deals at WLG
Every site we underwrite goes through a 5-year discounted cash flow with sensitivity tables on six variables: ramp speed, peak CPD, membership penetration, ARPM, churn, and labor cost. We won't recommend a site to capital partners that doesn't clear a 13% unlevered IRR at base case and an 8% IRR at downside case (revenue -15%, opex +20%). The IRR benchmarks have come down from where we set them in 2022; the discipline is unchanged.
If you're evaluating a greenfield project and want a model built on current operating data instead of broker assumptions, that's what we do.
Informational, not advice. This article is published for general industry-education purposes and reflects our team's operating experience and publicly available data at the time of writing. It is not investment, legal, accounting, or engineering advice and should not be relied on as the sole basis for any business or financial decision. Markets and conditions change. References to third-party brands, products, and companies are nominative and editorial; no endorsement is implied. See our Terms of Use.
Keep reading
- 9 min read
The 8 Non-Negotiables of Car Wash Site Selection in 2026
- 12 min read
How to Underwrite a Car Wash Acquisition in 2026: An IC-Grade Framework
- 13 min read
Choosing Tunnel Equipment in 2026: An Operator's Honest Take on OPW/Belanger, Trident, and ICS
- 12 min read
Car Wash Membership Economics in 2026: The Math That Actually Matters
